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Niche construction theory is a relatively new approach in evolutionary biology that
seeks to integrate an ecological dimension into the Darwinian theory of evolution by
natural selection. It is regarded by many evolutionary biologists as providing a significant
revision of the Neo-Darwinian modern synthesis that unified Darwin’s theory of natural
and sexual selection with 20th century population genetics. Niche construction theory
has been invoked as a processual mediator of social cognitive evolution and of the
emergence and evolution of language. I argue that language itself can be considered
as a biocultural niche and evolutionary artifact. I provide both a general analysis of
the cognitive and semiotic status of artifacts, and a formal analysis of language as
a social and semiotic institution, based upon a distinction between the fundamental
semiotic relations of “counting as” and “standing for.” I explore the consequences
for theories of language and language learning of viewing language as a biocultural
niche. I suggest that not only do niches mediate organism-organism interactions, but
also that organisms mediate niche-niche interactions in ways that affect evolutionary
processes, with the evolution of human infancy and childhood as a key example. I
argue that language as a social and semiotic system is not only grounded in embodied
engagements with the material and social-interactional world, but also grounds a sub-
class of artifacts of particular significance in the cultural history of human cognition.
Symbolic cognitive artifacts materially and semiotically mediate human cognition, and
are not merely informational repositories, but co-agentively constitutive of culturally and
historically emergent cognitive domains. I provide examples of the constitutive cognitive
role of symbolic cognitive artifacts drawn from my research with my colleagues on
cultural and linguistic conceptualizations of time, and their cultural variability. I conclude
by reflecting on the philosophical and social implications of understanding artifacts
co-agentively.
Keywords: biocultural niche construction, language, symbolic cognitive artifact, time concepts, human life
course, social institutions
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INTRODUCTION: ECOLOGY,
EVOLUTION, AND NICHE
CONSTRUCTION
The body is our general medium for having a world . . . Sometimes
the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body’s natural
means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects
thereby around itself a cultural world
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 146)
Niche construction theory is a relatively new approach in
evolutionary biology (though with important but neglected
precursors). It is regarded by many evolutionary biologists
as providing a signiﬁcant revision of the 20th century Neo-
Darwinian “modern synthesis” that uniﬁed Mendelian genetics
with Darwin’s theory of natural and sexual selection. Niche
construction theory has in recent years been recruited to enhance
explanatory accounts of cognitive, semiotic and language
evolution (Deacon, 2003; Odling-Smee and Laland, 2009; Sinha,
2009, 2013, 2014; Iriki and Taoka, 2012; Stutz, 2014), as well
as distributed cognition and abductive reasoning (Magnani and
Bardone, 2008). I elaborate and extend these accounts here, to
argue that niche construction theory lends support to a socio-
ecological theory of language as simultaneously a biocultural
niche and the foundational human social institution, and to oﬀer
an integrated account of biocultural evolutionary processes not
only in the distant past of human ancestors, but also in historical
time.
The most important features of niche construction theory for
the purposes of this article are:
(1) It accomplishes a re-uniﬁcation of Darwinian evolutionary
theory with ecological theory, in which niche (or
Umwelt, von Uexküll, 1957/1934), and organism-niche
co-dependency, are key notions. In so doing, it contributes
to the restoration to evolutionary theory of an integrative
perspective largely neglected in the Neo-Darwinian
synthesis. As Gontier and Serrelli (2014, unpublished
thesis) put it “Adopting the Weismann barrier . . . caused
a break with 19th century research on Epigenesis and
Embryology, as well as early works in Ecology, General
Systems Theory, and Cybernetics”. Alternative accounts,
however, continued to be developed throughout the 20th
century. Current developments in niche construction theory
(Laland et al., 2000; Odling-Smee et al., 2003) can be seen as
a continuation of the pioneering work of (Lewontin, 1970,
2000, 1983) and as complementary to other contemporary
signiﬁcant revisions of the Neo-Darwinian synthesis, such
as evolution-development synthesis (“evo-devo”; Jablonka
and Lamb, 2005; important precursors to these revisionist
trends in can be found inWaddington (1953, 1977), Ho and
Saunders (1984).
(2) It recasts the conceptualization of agency in evolution.
Ecologists emphasize that species shape, as well as being
shaped by, the niches that they occupy. In Neo-Darwinism
“the agent of selection is the extra-organismic environment,
including (a) the inanimate surround, (b) other species
(a and b together being the basis of natural selection);
together with (c) (subpopulations of) genes of the same
species (the basis of sexual and kin selection) . . . This
model, when appropriately formalized, can be extended
by including cultural traits in the environment, that act
as ‘ampliﬁers’ on the selection of genetic variation: this is
known as the theory of gene-culture co-evolution (Lumsden
and Wilson, 1981; Sinha, 2009, p. 292). Niche construction
theory places an equivalent and complementary emphasis
on the way in which organisms (and species) actively shape
their environment (including the cultural environment), so
that the dynamic of selection is driven by the behavior of the
“selected” as well as the “selector.” Co-agency, as much as
co-selection, is a crucial aspect of co-evolutionary processes.
This emphasis on the active organism is reminiscent of the
psychobiological theories of Piaget (1979), who argued for the
leading role of behavior in evolution; and Gibson (1979), in
whose ecological psychology a key role is played by aﬀordances:
“properties of the ecological niche aﬀording or supporting
speciﬁc kinds of action made possible by the motor system and
morphology of the animal. Such actions are both species-typical
(though not necessarily species unique) and adaptive. Because
aﬀordances, Gibson (1979) maintained, are directly perceived,
the phenomenal world of the animal is intrinsically meaningful,
in that it potentiates the activation of perception-action circuits:
objects present themselves as edible, climb-able, graspable and so
forth” (Sinha, 2009, p. 294). Gibson did not, however, suﬃciently
stress the importance of the animal’s own behavior in the
construction of aﬀordances (Magnani and Bardone, 2008).
Such behaviors can signiﬁcantly alter the environment
to which the organism must adapt, initiating a process of
positive feedback in which organism and environment are in a
complementary, mutually shaping relationship. “A ‘path’ may . . .
be an unintended consequence of locomotion from one place
to another, but it is, nevertheless, a useful one . . . such shaping
. . . can (however) introduce distal consequences—food shortage,
erosion, pollution, competition with other species—which are
outside the initial circuit of adaptation.” (Sinha, 1988, p. 136;
see also Costall, 2004). Niche construction theory is built upon
the recognition that the resulting niche can be construed as
more than a contingent consequence of behavior. It is a quasi-
artifact, to which the species is genetically, morphologically and
behaviorally adapted, and which is integral to the evolutionary
strategy of the species.
The term “quasi-artifact” signiﬁes that, unlike the canonical
case of human artifacts (analyzed below), such animal
constructions need not be produced intentionally. Examples
of animal quasi-artifacts are the nests of bower birds and the
dams of beavers (Sinha, 2009, p. 294). The male bower bird
builds and decorates an elaborate nest to attract females, using
attractive objects such as ﬂowers, shells and leaves. The bower
forms an integral part of the male’s mating strategy, and sexual
selection by the female is based upon the esthetic qualities of the
bower, as well as upon the behavioral display of the male. Beavers
construct dams, through coordinated and collaborative behavior,
that both defend the colony against predators and enhance the
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availability of food. Beavers’ dams serve not only as a constructed,
quasi-artifactual niche for beavers themselves, but also as a key
factor in the maintenance of the wetland ecology enabling many
other species to thrive. In suchlike cases, the behavioral repertoire
of the species includes behaviors that are speciﬁcally adapted to
the making of the quasi-artifactual niche, and these behaviors in
turn support wider repertoires of behavioral strategies exploiting
the niche. Quasi-artifactual niches are adaptive precisely because
of the behaviors and strategies that they aﬀord—nests are for
nesting, and burrows are for burrowing.
A quasi-artifactual material niche can be regarded as an
extension either of a behavioral repertoire (e.g., male mating
display); or of the organism’s morphology (e.g., the bower bird’s
bower is functionally equivalent, as a ﬁtness indicator, to the tail
of the peacock). Similarly, not only material constructions, such
as nests or dams, but also species-speciﬁc behavioral repertoires
(such as birdsong) can also be considered to be animal quasi-
artifactual niches, inasmuch the song of the adults provides
an environment within which singing behavior is epigenetically
learned (Marler and Peters, 1982; Sinha, 2004). Such culturally
transmitted, specialized behavioral repertoires are biocultural
quasi-artifacts, functionally equivalent to, and constructively
integrated with, material quasi-artifacts. There is no reason not to
view human natural languages in the same way. This conclusion
extends the proposal that hominid niche construction created
conditions favorable for the emergence and evolution of language
(Odling-Smee and Laland, 2009; Whiten and Erdal, 2012; Dediu
and Levinson, 2013), by conceptualizing language itself as a
symbolic biocultural niche/artifact (Sinha, 2009, 2013, 2014).
The ability to act in the biocultural niche of language (and
the ability to learn how to act in it) involves not only the
replication of phylogenetic adaptation to this niche, but the
evolution and replication of an entire symbolically mediated
biocultural complex. As Laland et al. (2000, p. 144) put it,
niche construction “reestablishes the organism (or rather, classes
of organism) as the central unit of human evolution, not as
vehicle but as replicator. In fact, what is really replicated is
a biocultural complex, with a composite array of information
(acquired through multiple processes and stored at diﬀerent
levels) and inherited resources.” It should be clear that there can
be no hard-and-fast distinction, from a biocultural perspective,
between “niche” and “artifact”: a burrow, or a bower, are
both artifacts and niches, and the biocultural complex includes
the information, both in the genome of the organism and
in the niche, that is required to learn how exploit it. This
does not mean that the genetic information is a “copy of” or
“blueprint for” for the artifact/niche; rather it is an adaptation
to a constructive behavioral relationship between organism and
niche. The same is, I suggest, true for language. The artifact/niche
duality can be illustrated by a more recent example, namely the
internet as a socio-semiotic ecology which is itself dependent
upon the biocultural artifact/niche of language. The biocultural
complex can be conceptualized as an evolving dynamic system
comprising interlocking niches of diﬀerent scale and granularity
(see also Hutchins, 2013). I propose below, in regard to
language and infancy, that the biocultural complex may include
niche-niche interactions mediated by organismic evolution,
as well organism-niche interactions mediated by organismic
behavior.
Although other species than humans may display behaviors
that can be regarded as both cultural and culturally transmitted
(Whiten et al., 1999), human culture is distinguished by
the predominant place occupied in the human biocultural
complex by language—the foundation of what anthropologists
call “symbolic culture,” and the semiotician Lotman (1990)
called the semiosphere: the ensemble of linguistically based
semiotic resources implicated in the establishment, maintenance
and transformation of socio-cultural habitus (Bourdieu, 1977).
Language may be the cornerstone of human culture, but it is
also culturally situated, that is, it is dynamically embedded within
the entire biocultural complex that includes other symbolic and
non-symbolic artifacts. Treating language as a biocultural niche
permits the uniﬁcation, in a non-reductionist fashion, of the
evolutionary dynamic of symbolic culture (the semiosphere) with
that of material culture (the technosphere; Sinha, 2013). We
should note, moreover, that the distinction between material
culture and symbolic culture has been under increasing challenge
in contemporary anthropology. As Boivin (2008, p. 190) has
pointed out “Tools, technologies, and other aspects of the
material world of humans and their predecessors have largely
been seen as the outcome of evolutionary developments, and
little attempt has been made to investigate their potential role
as selection forces during the course of human evolution.” The
same can be said of the biocultural niche of language, which
is intricately interwoven with the other material and symbolic
artifactual niche-structures that make up the human biocultural
complex.
MEANING AND MATERIALITY:
ARTIFACTS, COGNITION AND SEMIOSIS
The materiality of meaning and meaningfulness of materiality
is central to approaches in cognitive science emphasizing the
importance of objects in extended cognitive embodiment (Sinha
and Jensen de López, 2000); and in which cognition and
communication are distributed over material-symbolic cognitive
niches (e.g., Clark, 2006; Magnani, 2009; Sinha, 2014). All
(human) artifacts are cognitive, inasmuch as they embody human
intentionality (Bloom, 1996). Although the semiotic properties of
artifacts have been comprehensively addressed in developmental
psychology (e.g., Sinha, 1988, 2005; Rodríguez and Moro, 2002;
Sinha and Rodríguez, 2008; Moro, 2011), the topic has received
scant attention more widely in cognitive science. In general,
artifacts have the following characteristics:
(1) Artifacts are made, not found. Although found objects
may be used as tools, as with for example the sticks that
chimpanzees use for “ﬁshing” termites; or as constituents
of artifacts, as with stones used by humans to construct
dwellings and walls, artifacts (including artifactual tools) are
produced by labor.
(2) Artifacts embody intentionality, conceptualization and
imagination. An artifact is made according to a plan
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or design that involves the conceptual or imaginative
representation by the maker of the ﬁnished article. It is this
characteristic that distinguishes true artifacts from quasi-
artifacts, and as far as we know the only species that
produces true artifacts is homo sapiens, or as our species has
also been aptly named, homo faber.
(3) Artifacts have canonical functions (Sinha, 1988) that are
physically realized in the design features (or culturally
produced aﬀordances) of the artifact. The canonical
function of an artifact is equivalent to the use value (Marx,
1976/1867) for which it was designed: its socially standard
function. Non-artifactual (natural) objects or materials
(such as wood or stone) may have use-values, but only
artifacts have canonical functions. The canonical function
of the artifact is embodied in the artifact. For example,
the canonical function of a knife is to cut, the canonical
function of a cup is to contain. The artifact can therefore be
seen as embodying functional or relational concepts, such
as CUTTING or CONTAINMENT, and these concepts are
precisely those that are the objects of the design intentions
of the maker.
(4) Artifacts signify their canonical function to a user who has
the cognitive capacity to recognize the artifact as a token of
a particular type (Sinha, 1988). The mode of signiﬁcation
that is intrinsic to the artifact is that of “counting as” (Searle,
1995; Tummolini and Castelfranchi, 2006). For example,
a particular object (token) counts as a cup (type) if the
perceiving subject recognizes the design features of the
object (being a solid of a certain size and shape, having a
cavity aﬀording containment) as being those of a cup. This
recognition of the signiﬁcation relationship of counting as is
a case of perceiving as – the subject perceives the object as a
cup. If the object is not perceived as a token of a type having
a canonical function, then it cannot be said to count as that
type for the particular subject.
(5) To count as a type of artifact it is necessary for an object
not only to aﬀord the canonical function of the type (e.g.,
containment), but for this to be the intentionally designed
canonical function of the token. For example, a half coconut
shell can be used as a cup, but that does not make it a cup,
unless it is intended to count as a cup, by virtue either of
context or of baptismal naming.
(6) The counting as relationship, and the canonical function
that deﬁnes the artifactual type, are normative and cognitive.
They are aspects of normative and socially complex
cognition. Canonical function depends upon, but is not
reducible to, the physical properties of the object, since it is
only by virtue of some subset of its physical characteristics
(those that enable the object to be perceived as and
used as a token of the artifactual type), and of their
signifying value for the subject/agent, that the object
counts as that artifact. We can thus compare artifacts with
“institutional facts” (Searle, 1995), such as that a person is
someone else’s sister-in-law, a social relationship that is also
irreducible to the properties of the person’s physical body.
In the next section, I analyze language as a socio-semiotic
institution.
The characteristics listed above make it clear that artifacts are
cognitively and semiotically complex.Artifacts (ranging from tools
and vessels to notations and images) can be “read” (in the sense of
“perceived as”), but (unless they are textual artifacts) they are not
(contrary to inﬂuential postmodern theories) texts. The canonical
functions that are served by artifacts are diverse, since they may
be implicated in a wide range of cultural practices, both sacred
and profane, including ritual, ornamentation, representation and
narration, as well as technology.
Artifacts can support both non-representational practices
(such as cutting and sewing) and representational practices (such
as drawing and signposting). Although an artifact embodies
and signiﬁes its canonical function, it does not represent it
(for a discussion of representation and signiﬁcation, see Sinha,
1988, p. 44).The representational relationship can, following a
long tradition in semiotics, be abbreviated as “X stands for
Y in Context C”. This formulation expresses the relationship
of “standing for” analogously with the abbreviation of the
“counting as” relationship by Searle (1995) as “X counts as Y
in Context C”. A full deﬁnition of representation is provided
by Sinha (1988, p. 37): “To represent something –a scene, an
event, an object, an interest—is to cause something else to stand
for it, in such a way that both the relationship of ‘standing
for,’ and that which is intended to be represented, can be
recognized.”
To summarize: artifacts do not represent, or stand for, their
canonical function, rather they signify it by counting as a token of
the type deﬁned by that function. Some artifacts, however, such as
pictures, symbols and texts are also representational, embodying
the standing for function in addition to the counting as function.
The concatenation, in representation, of the standing for and the
counting as relationships will be important for the analysis of
language as a socio-semiotic institution in the following section.
Artifacts signify not only their canonical functions, but by
extension the complexes of practices that they support (Sinha,
1988); and what is signiﬁed by the same object is not necessarily
identical between diﬀerent communities, contexts and universes
of discourse. For example, Jensen de López (2002) found that
young European children are biased in their actions directed to
baskets by their perception and conceptualization of the object
as a canonical container; while children from the indigenous
Central American Zapotec culture do not display such a bias—a
ﬁnding that was attributed to cultural diﬀerences in the habitual
practices in which this class of objects are regularly used (Sinha
and Jensen de López, 2000; Jensen de Lopez et al., 2005).
Artifacts, like words, may be polysemous in terms of what
they signify and how they are perceived. For example, a
smartphone may be perceived as just a token of the general
type, but it may also be perceived as a token of a particular
brand-name-deﬁned type, and thus signify the social status and
aspirational identity of its owner. The recruitment of objects-as-
signs in interactive contexts is of great importance in ontogenetic
cognitive development (Sinha, 2005). Given the status and
complexity of artifacts as social-material signiﬁers, it is not
surprising that the ontogenetic development of understanding
of the canonical functions of artifactual objects, and their
appropriation in practical and playful action, has a time course
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that is roughly correlated with the onset and consolidation of the
acquisition of language (Sinha, 1988; Sinha and Rodríguez, 2008).
My prime concern here is with technological artifacts, that
is tools or tool complexes whose canonical functions involve
the ampliﬁcation of the physical and/or mental powers of the
agent: “Conceptualization of artifacts is a form of empowerment”
(Tummolini and Castelfranchi, 2006, p. 311). Technologies may
be classiﬁed in terms of the diﬀerent kinds of powers that they
amplify: motor (e.g., the hammer); perceptual (e.g., the telescope
or telephone); or cognitive (e.g., the abacus). There is also,
however, a further dimension in the typology of technological
artifacts, namely the dimension of augmentation vs. constitution
of the powers of the agent. Some technologies amplify the
powers of the agent by augmenting already existing capacities and
practices. For example, a bow and arrow augments the muscular
power of the agent, enabling the arrow to be projected further
and with a higher velocity than would be possible by throwing.
Other technologies amplify the agent’s powers by potentiating and
constituting entirely new practices. For example, a needle and
thread potentiate sewing, a practice that would be impossible
without the use of the technology, which can therefore be
considered as constitutive of the practice.
Signs (including linguistic signs) and tools have frequently
been compared. Bühler (1990/1934), inﬂuenced by the
functionalism of Prague School linguistics, proposed the
Organon Model of language (from the Greek Oργαανoν,
meaning ‘instrument, tool, organ’. Vygotsky (1978/1930) also
conceptualized signs as instruments, that not only enable
communication between individuals, but also transform
intra-individual cognition. Vygotsky (1978/1930) regarded the
analogy as resting on the fact that both sign and tool support
mediated activity; but he also distinguished between their
modes of mediation: while tools, he argued, are “outer directed,”
transforming the material world, signs are “inner directed,”
transforming and governing mind, self and behavior (Vygotsky,
1978/1930, pp. 54–55). Vygotsky (1978/1930) emphasized the
importance of semiotic mediation in transforming cognition
and cognitive development, focusing on the internalization of
conventional signs originating in contexts of discursive practice.
He attributed great importance to the formative role of language
in the emergence of “inner speech” and “verbal thought,” but
his employment of the concept of semiotic mediation also
encompassed the use of non-systematic signs, including objects-
as-signifers. He paid little attention, however, to the role of
culturally produced, linguistically grounded symbolic cognitive
artifacts (see below).
Although I do not wish to advocate a technological determinist
view of history, it is important to note that the socio-
cultural consequences of practice-constituting technologies, and
combinations of technologies, may be profound. Anderson
(1991) discusses the emergence in the 16th–17th centuries of
what he calls “print capitalism.” Mercantile capitalism based
upon trade was not new, but the rapid dissemination of
information made possible by print media, such as shipping lists
and newspapers, paved the way for the emergence of the limited
joint stock company, a new institutional form that transformed
the world, ushering in the ﬁrst era of economic globalization.
We might refer here, too, to the rather earlier invention of
double-entry book-keeping as an accounting device permitting
accurate recording and balancing of proﬁts, losses, liabilities and
assets. Double entry book-keeping is a good example of a symbolic
cognitive artifact, the fundamental form of cognitive technologies
(Norman, 1993). Double entry book-keeping is a technique for
the ordering of symbolic (in this case numeric) information,
in such a way that it permits the checking and auditing of
accounts. It is not only desirable for individual traders, but it
also provides necessary evidential support for the trust-based
interpersonal relations involved in joint ﬁnancial enterprises.
Like other symbolic cognitive artifacts, it is a tool for thought
(Waddington, 1977) that is transformative of both the individual
mind and the shared, intersubjective mind.
Examples of symbolic cognitive artifacts are notational
systems (including writing and numeric notations), dials,
calendars and compasses. Symbolic and/or cognitive artifacts
(Norman, 1993) have been plausibly proposed as key components
of human cognitive evolution, in virtue of their status as external
representations of cultural and symbolic practices (Donald,
1991). I will attempt to advance the argument further, by
proposing that symbolic cognitive artifacts also have the status of
agents of change in cultural-cognitive evolution, and are not mere
repositories of prior changes in practices and cognitive structures
and strategies. Cultural and cognitive schemas (Shore, 1996)
organizing at least some conceptual domains may be considered,
I shall argue, as dependent upon, and not merely expressed by,
the employment of symbolic artifacts in cultural and cognitive
practices.
To qualify as symbolic, an artifact must embody a
representational function (Bühler, 1990/1934). Although all
artifacts signify, inasmuch as their perceptible material form
signiﬁes their canonical function, only symbolic cognitive
artifacts represent something outside themselves, through a
sign function realized or embodied in the artifact1. All such
sign functions are ultimately grounded in language, although
they frequently (as in the case of compasses and maps) also
incorporate iconic relations2. I deﬁne the class of symbolic
cognitive artifacts as comprising those artifacts—which may
either be entirely symbolic, such as number systems, or may
embed or “anchor” symbolic information in material structures
(Hutchins, 2005)—that support symbolic and conceptual processes
in abstract conceptual domains. A key property of symbolic
cognitive artifacts is thus that they are both linguistically
grounded and conventional. Symbolic cognitive artifacts may be
motivated by natural facts, and the human phenomenological
1“Symbol” and “symbolic” are notoriously polysemous and contested concepts. In
accordance with Bühler’s (1990/1934) classiﬁcation, symbolicity is here understood
in terms of the semiotic, pragmatic and intersubjective logic of communicative
representation, not on the typology in the Peircian sense (Peirce, 1931/1958) of
the relationship between sign and object (see also Sinha, 1988, 2004).
2Iconic signs, such as pictures, may also have a representational function, but are
not necessarily cognitive artifacts, since their function may be entirely aesthetic.
Maps, which are cognitive artifacts, are often regarded as iconic signs, but they
depend not only on the iconic representation of the territory, but also upon
the linguistic naming of places within it; and their use is always within the
intersubjective ﬁeld of a universe of discourse. In Bühlerian terms, they are (like
Chinese ideographs) iconically motivated symbolic forms.
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experience of these facts, (e.g., the orbit of sun or moon; the
number of ﬁngers on a human hand), but they are not determined
by them (witness, for example, the variety of arithmetical bases
for number systems; Sinha et al., 2011, pp. 141–142).
Symbolic cognitive artifacts are both world-transforming
and mind-transforming (Figure 1). They are tools that aﬀord
and augment human interactions with the natural and social
world; and they are simultaneously signs that mediate those
interactions. As material anchors, and key nodes in the
intersection of symbolic practice and material practice, symbolic
cognitive artifacts also exemplify the co-construction and co-
development of the interwoven semiosphere and technosphere.
Symbolic cognitive artifacts, just as much as language, are
constitutive parts of the human biocultural niche, and are of
fundamental importance in human cultural-cognitive evolution.
They aﬀord symbolic systems and conceptual schemas that
underpin the socio-cognitive practices (and the reproduction of
these practices) constituting a segment of the life world (Schutz,
1966) of individual and group. The invention and use of symbolic
cognitive artifacts is a crucial (and species-speciﬁc) aspect of the
“ratchet eﬀect” (Tomasello, 1999) in human cultural evolution3.
The eﬀects of such transformations on human cultural-cognitive-
symbolic ecology may (as I argue below in relation to the calendar
and the clock) be profound and (absent catastrophic social
collapse) irreversible.
LANGUAGE AS A SOCIAL-SEMIOTIC
INSTITUTION
Language, I have argued, is both a biocultural artifact/niche,
and the semiotic foundation of symbolic cognitive artifacts.
3The “ratchet eﬀect” consists in the cumulative intergenerational transmission of
cultural innovation, and appears to be unique to the human species. Its eﬀective
operationmay also depend upon the demographic factor of population size (Dediu
and Levinson, 2013).
But that is not all. The symbolic cultures that human beings
(and only human beings) have evolved are made possible by
the social sharing of mind for which language is the principal
vehicle (Zlatev et al., 2008). “Language is a social institution”
(de Saussure, 1988/1916, p. 118) is one of the most oft-cited
quotations attributed to Saussure (see also Stawarska, 2015).
Language therefore has a dual ontology (Sinha, 2006), being
both part of distinctive human biological species-being, and the
foundational human social institution.
How can we employ the analysis I have oﬀered above to
clarify this nature of language as a social institution? My point
of departure is the theoretical treatment of social facts and
social institutions by two scholars whose work is separated
by a century: the sociologist Durkheim (1982/1895) and the
philosopher Searle (1995). I oﬀer a semiotic interpretation of
Searle’s theory, while characterizing the objectivity of language
(and other social institutions) in Durkheimian terms; and derive
from this discussion a formal deﬁnition of language that permits
the diﬀerentiation of the traditional subsystems recognized
in linguistic theory without recourse to a truth-conditional
semantics4.
Durkheim (1982/1895) oﬀered a theoretical and
methodological clariﬁcation of social science and its object.
This object he stipulated to be the domain of social facts, which
he described as “a category of facts which present very special
characteristics: they consist of manners of acting, thinking, and
feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a
coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over
him.” (Durkheim, 1982/1895, p. 30). Social facts, for Durkheim
(1982/1895), are not merely aggregates of the individual cognitive
representations of them by the subjects that are regulated, or
“coerced,” by the social facts, since for each individual subject
the social fact presents itself as a part of an out-there, already
4The formalisms and argumentative framework in the remainder of this section
were ﬁrst presented in Sinha (2009).
FIGURE 1 | The bi-directionality of mediated action employing symbolic cognitive artifacts. Figure © Chris Sinha.
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given objective reality. The objectivity of social facts consists,
for Durkheim (1982/1895), in the fact they are independent of
any single individual’s thoughts or will. As Jones (1986, p. 61)
puts it, “it is precisely this property of resistance to the action
of individual wills which characterizes social facts. The most
basic rule of all sociological method, Durkheim (1982/1895)
thus concluded, is to treat social facts as things.” Durkheim’s
(1982/1895) treatment of social facts consists therefore in, ﬁrst,
an ontological proposition, that social facts are irreducible to
biological or psychological facts (or structures or processes);
coupled with, second, an epistemological and methodological
proposition regarding their treatment: as objects of a particular
kind, whose determinate nature consists in their “coercion” of
conduct.
Durkheim (1982/1895) has often been criticized for the
breadth and vagueness of his notion of “social fact.” A particularly
problematic aspect of his theory is that, in counterposing
“social facts” to “individual conscience” (or mind), he sometimes
identiﬁed the former with “states of the collective mind.” Some
social psychologists (e.g., Moscovici, 2000) have followed this
direction in constructing a theory of “social representations,”
but critics have claimed that Durkheim (1982/1895) sympathized
with a view of society as a kind of super-organic “collective
personality.” Whether Durkheim (1982/1895) believed in a
“collective mind” or not, such a notion is not only scientiﬁcally
dubious, it is unnecessary. I propose that a social fact can most
simply be deﬁned as something regulating an aspect of conduct
which requires the participation (Goodwin and Goodwin, 2004)
of more than one individual. This “something” may be a codiﬁed
law, a norm, a canon of interpretation, an institution or a rule
in the sense of Wittgenstein (1961). Social facts, for mature
human beings, are objects of common knowledge; language is
a prime example of this (Lewis, 1969; Itkonen, 1983; Clark,
1996). However, the social fact itself is not the sum, average or
common denominator of all the individual beliefs of participants
(since it is, indeed, the object of these beliefs). Social facts, in
this sense, are in some way prior to individual cognitions about
them. Yet it cannot be claimed that social facts are independent
of cognitions, since their normative status is dependent upon
agreement in cognition. We shall return to this paradoxical
problem in discussing Searle’s theory of social facts.
Given that non-human species also display social behaviors,
should we regard social facts as being uniquely human?
Ethologists have pointed to the evolutionary roots of norms,
rules and conventions in the ritualized displays that many
species exhibit in, for example, mating and agonistic displays.
Ritualization, in turn, can be regarded as falling under the
deﬁnition of a biocultural niche as discussed above. If so, we
could argue that social facts are nothing other than biocultural
niches regulating and sustaining, supporting, and constraining,
the participatory behavior of more than one individual. This
deﬁnition is entirely consonant with Durkheim’s (1982/1895)
view that social facts “consist of manners of acting, thinking,
and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a
coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him.”
Under this interpretation, social facts would be seen as
no more unique to humans than culture. Yet there is clearly
something unique about human social facts. This uniqueness
consists, surely, in the way in which social facts are cognitively
constructed as objects of intersubjective common knowledge,
common commitment, and common emotional investment, so
that they can be known in the way in which the rules of
football, the laws of the land, or a family history may be
known. To bring some order into the deﬁnitions and terminology
employed here, I will use below the term “social institution”
to refer to systems of social facts. I will further stipulate that
the concept of “social institution” pertains to social knowledge
systems that are of a fully normative nature; that is, those
which not only regulate behavior, but are known to do so, and
knowledge of which (whether explicit or tacit) is essential to
their regulative status. Social institutions, on this deﬁnition, can
only be constructed by human beings with a certain level of
cognitive development, although they may be participated in
by animals which lack this cognitive status (e.g., prelinguistic
infants in language practices, racehorses in horse races etc).
Social institutions, then, constitute an emergent ontological level,
within the wider category of biocultural niches, and one which is
uniquely human.
Searle (1995) situates knowledge and belief at the heart of
his account of social (or institutional) facts: “There are things
that exist only because we believe them to exist. I am thinking
of things like money, property, government, and marriages . . .
(such) Institutional facts are so called because they depend upon
human institutions for their existence” (Searle, 1995, pp. 1–2).
Searle’s (1995) account of social or institutional facts (such as
money) is that they depend upon collective agreement and
knowledge that, under determinate rules, something counts as an
instance of a social object. The general form of such rules is:
(1) “X counts as Y in context C” (Searle, 1995, p. 28).
Although he never uses the term, Searle’s (1995) deﬁnition
is a semiotic one, in that the “counting as” relationship is one
of meaning or signiﬁcation. The twenty dollar bill, for example,
signiﬁes a certain monetary value or equivalence. However, the
relationship between the bill and its monetary value is not
a fully ﬂedged sign relationship. The bill does not represent
or stand for twenty dollars: it simply is twenty dollars, it is
self-identical to its monetary exchange value. To clarify this
diﬀerence, we can point out that the numeral 20 printed on
the bill stands for (represents) the number twenty, but the bill
itself does not represent, for example, 20 (tokens of) one dollar
bills, but rather is equivalent to them in value. Representation,
in contrast, involves more than equivalence and categorization.
Sinha (1988) deﬁnes the pragmatic and semiotic conditions on
representation as follows: “To represent something . . . is to
cause something else to stand for it, in such a way that both
the relationship of ‘standing for,’ and that which is intended
to be represented, can be recognized” (37). Intrinsic to the
conditions on representation is a duality of cognition, paralleling
the duality of sign structure (the conventional unity of signifying
substance and its signiﬁcation). Two cognitions are necessitated:
the recognition of the sign relationship, and the recognition of
what is signiﬁed. The “counting as” relationship, by contrast, has
no such duality: to know that something counts as a particular
object, however, abstract or complex that object may be, it is
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necessary only to recognize it as a token of that category of
objects.
What is necessary to grasp the “counting as” relationship is
knowledge of the rules and norms that constitute the category
(for example money, or a language). In one fundamental (if
limited) sense, then, knowledge of a language is knowledge of
what counts as a token of the language, and in order to know
this, the knowing subject must necessarily know (in some way
and to some degree) the rules of the language. It is this level of
knowledge that is considered to be primary in generativist and
other formalist theories of language, whose goal is to elucidate
the rules that constitute (or generate) the full range of tokens for
which it is the case that:
(2) X counts as (a sentence) S in L (a language)
This deﬁnition does not, however, touch on the
representational function of language (Sinha, 1988; Bühler,
1990/1934). That is, the capacity of the linguistic symbol in use
to represent things (situations, events, actions, objects) outside
the formal context of L: that is, the world outside language.
Knowledge of (2), in itself, does not enable the knower to use
the language representationally, any more than knowledge that a
piece of paper is a twenty dollar bill in itself enables the knower to
use the bill in ﬁnancial transactions. Knowledge of (2) is (akin to)
knowledge of language in the narrow sense (Hauser et al., 2002):
it is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition of being a language
user, since it encompasses neither semantics not pragmatics.
The knowledge constituting the semantic domain is governed,
not by the “counting as” relationship and its conditions, but by
the “standing for” relationship” and its conditions. This “standing
for” relationship can be notated, in a way parallel with Searle’s
(1995) notation of the “counting as” relationship, as follows:
(3) S (a sign) stands for M (a message) in context C
However, the duality inherent in the conditions on
representation (above) requires that this preliminary notation be
expanded, to include knowledge on the part of the subject that
S counts as a sign, or, more accurately, that a particular object
counts as a signiﬁer. This expansion yields:
(4) [X counts as S and S stands for M] in C
Where X is a token of the class of signiﬁers in C
(4) is suﬃciently general to cover all cases of sign use,
including highly idiosyncratic and context bound cases, such as
non-conventional gestures. It is not restricted to language. We
can now undertake a further expansion to specify cases in which
a given sign is part of a conventional sign system, shared by a
particular community of users:
(5) [X counts as S and S stands for M in Cs] for Cu
Where:
Cs = conventional sign system
Cu = community of users
In the speciﬁc case of language, we can reduce the notion of a
sign system shared by a community of users to the simple term L,
language, thus:
(6) L= Cs for Cu
This is equivalent to the statement that a language L is a
conventional system of signs used by a community of users.
Now any grammatical and conventionally meaningful instance
of language use X can be expressed as follows:
(7) [X counts as S and S stands for M] in L
Note that, consistently with the approach of Cognitive
Grammar (Langacker, 1987), S (the signiﬁer) is an expression
at any level, sub-lexical, lexical or constructional; grammatical
assemblies of signs are also signs. The deﬁnition oﬀered in (7)
can thus be considered to be the notational reduction of the
broader theoretical approach to language taken by cognitive
and functional semantically based theories, and indeed by all
linguistic theories that include representational meaning in the
linguistic theory. It is clearly a more inclusive deﬁnition than the
formal-sentential deﬁnition (2), reproduced here:
(2) X counts as (a sentence) S in L
Deﬁnition (7) is also, quite simply, more psychologically
complete than (2): what we usually mean by “knowing a
language” is the knowledge of both what counts as a token of the
language, and what it means (stands for) when standardly used.
In concluding this section, I will attempt to elucidate further just
what is, and is not, necessary for such knowledge. Before doing so,
I pursue this formal-notational exercise further by exploring how
the conjoint deﬁnitions of “counting as” and “standing for” can
be employed to deﬁne the sub-systems of language as traditionally
employed in linguistic theory.
Grammar (in the wide, cognitive grammar sense, including
lexical form and phonology) can be deﬁned as:
(8) X counts as S in L
X is an instance of S, and S is a grammatical expression in L.
The distinction between X and S is the distinction between, for
example, phonetics and phonology.
Presupposing (8), semantics can be deﬁned as:
(9) S stands for M in L
This is the relation between, for example, word form and
lexical entry or concept; or, more generally, between linguistic
expression and linguist conceptualization. What, however, of
pragmatics? The Gricean account of the distinction between
semantics and pragmatics (Grice, 1989) is summarized by
Kempson (1988, p. 139) as follows: “Semantics provides a
complete account of sentence meaning for the language, (by)
recursively specifying the truth conditions of the sentences
of the language . . . Pragmatics provides an account of
how sentences are used in utterances to convey information
in context.” Cognitive linguists reject the truth-conditional
account of linguistic meaning, and with it the distinction
between pragmatics and semantics, in favor of an account
based upon convention and entrenched usage. As Langacker
(2004, p. 70) puts it, there is “no a priori reason to
accept the reality of the semantics/pragmatics dichotomy.”
He argues that this is because there are “gradation(s) of
centrality in the speciﬁcations constituting our encyclopedic
knowledge of an entity.” In other words, he argues that one
cannot reliably distinguish “core meaning” from encyclopedic
meaning, since all usage is to a greater or lesser extent
encyclopedic.
However, a distinction may be real even if it is granted that it
is vague, or even undecidable, since along with undecidable cases
there may be clear-cut cases. Itkonen (1978, p. 108) makes this
point clearly and forcefully: “All distinctions which either involve
social life... or obtain in it are relative . . .However, . . . even if each
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of the distinctions concerned forms a continuum, the end points
of such a continuum are ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT (in the
relevant respect).” The deﬁnition of semantics that I have oﬀered
in (9) above does not depend upon a truth conditional account
of meaning: it is based upon meaning in conventional usage.
How can we extend and modify this account to incorporate non-
conventional, contextually determined variations inmeaning, the
traditional domain of pragmatics?
Presupposing (9), pragmatics can be deﬁned as:
(10) S counts as As for Participants(2 ...n) in Cd
Where:
As = Speech act (including reference)
Cd = Discourse context
Under this description, pragmatics is the closest of the
linguistic subsystems to a pure instantiation of the “counting
as” relationship. This accords with the intuition that pragmatics
is not “systematic” in quite the same way as grammar and
semantics; that speech acts are speciﬁcally linguistic instances
of more general communicative acts (such as “threats” and
“invitations” in both human and non-human species); and that
their interpretation is strongly dependent on gesture, prosody,
posture, physical, and linguistic context.
Having employed the notational formalism to distinguish
the subsystems of language one from another, we can now re-
assemble them to analyze the structure of particular utterances in
their context.
(11) [X counts as S and S stands for M] in L and S counts as As
for Participants (2 ...n) in Cd
Such a re-assembly does not yet account for the interaction
between semantics, pragmatics, extra-linguistic context and
shared world knowledge in actual utterances. For example, if
the utterance is “You really did well this time!”, and it is clear
from the context that the speech act is one of ironic praise, the
contextual meaning is “You did very badly.” Or, if the utterance
is “The road meanders up the hill,” the contextual meaning is that
the road has a winding path, not that the road is itself in motion
(Talmy, 1996). How can we capture such facts of language?
It seems impossible to do so without appealing to
psychological processes such as inference, default and prototypic
reasoning, subjectivization and perspectivization (Langacker,
1987). If we wish to formalize this, it would look something like
this:
(12) [X counts as S and S stands for M] in L and S counts as As
in Cd
=>S counts as (having) Mc for H in Cd
Where:
Mc = Contextual meaning
H= Hearer
Cd = Discourse context
This brings us back, in an intriguing hermeneutic circle, to
Searle’s (1995) original deﬁnition of a social fact, and emphasizes
the truism that, in the end, all meaning is contextual and situated.
This does not, however, mean the same as saying that there are
no institutionalized, relatively stable, relatively autonomous and
systematic linguistic facts; indeed, it is precisely this very relative
stability and autonomy which constitutes the objectivity of social
facts emphasized by Durkheim (1982/1895).
This objectivity is not to be confused with the objectivism of
formal, truth conditional semantics. Amongst the advantages of
the simple notational deﬁnitions developed here are:
• The account of semantic meaning is underdetermined by
this formulation. The semantic theory need not be truth-
functional, but is (necessarily) conventional and normative (as
indeed are all the subsystems).
• Semantics is distinguished from pragmatics without
necessitating a truth functional semantics.
• Contextual dependence characterizes all subsystems, as well
as the interactions between them, but does not erase the
distinctions between them.
• Language has its own proper structure which necessitates, but
is irreducible to, the intentionality of its users. Language, like
all social institutions, is an objectiﬁcation of intersubjectivity,
with an emergent structure relatively autonomous from the
intentional states (such as mutual knowledge of the language)
which are possessed by its users. It is in this fact, and this fact
alone, that the objectivity of language inheres.
What implications does this analysis hold for theories of the
human language capacity and language acquisition? Although
there can be no scientiﬁc objection to the study of language as
a purely formal system, insistence on the disciplinary autonomy
and full explanatory adequacy of formal theories leads to
a distorted picture of the human language capacity, and to
unnecessarily constrained theories of language acquisition. If
“knowledge of language” is restricted to knowledge of what
counts as a grammatical sentence, not only is language itself
as a semiotic system truncated and reduced, but the process
of its acquisition is rendered incomprehensible. It is to ﬁll this
conceptual vacuum that innate knowledge of Universal Grammar
has been invoked (Chomsky, 2000).
Furthermore, the identiﬁcation of language with knowledge
of language is a fundamental error, involving a conﬂation of
ontology and epistemology. Language as a social institution
is an (inter)-objectiﬁcation of intersubjectivity. It cannot be
identiﬁed with inter-individually variable individual knowledge
either of the “how” of participation in language practices, or
of the “what” of the language system that normatively regulates
such participation. This is not a new point. It was emphatically
stated by McNeill (1979, p. 293) who wrote: “Grammars refer
to real structures, though not to psychologically real structures
in the processing sense . . . a grammar is a description of our
knowledge of a social institution—the language—and because
of this basis in social or institutional reality, rather than in
cognitive functioning, grammars and psychological processes
have no more than (a) loose relationship . . . The role of grammar
during speech programming is analogous to the role of other
social institutions in individual behavior. This role is to deﬁne
and evaluate the behavior of individuals. It is not to cause the
behavior.”
I would wish to qualify this satisfyingly prescient quote by
emphasizing that (a) “our knowledge of a social institution”
should be understood as “analyst’s knowledge,” rather than
“speaker’s knowledge,” (b) “deﬁne and evaluate” should be
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understood, in the inﬂuential terms introduced by Searle (1969),
as “constituting and regulating”; and (c) the irreducibility of the
rules of language (or any other system of norms) to individual
cognition of these rules does not mean that individual cognition
plays no part at all in their emergence, development, and
evolution (Boella and van der Torre, 2004).
Language is both a biocultural niche, and a social institution
normatively regulating linguistic practice, and it is the practical
ability to adhere to its conventions that is acquired by the
language learner. From this perspective, “knowledge of language”
is both richer, in one sense, and poorer, in another, than that to
which we have become accustomed from generative linguistics.
It is richer because it incorporates meaning and context, the
fundamental pillars supporting both language acquisition and
language use. It is poorer because there is no longer a compelling
reason to attribute a knowledge equivalent to the results of
formal analysis to the learners and users of language. Simply
stated, in the biocultural approach, there is no mental grammar
isomorphic with autonomous grammar. The learner need not
internalize a formal description of the structure in order to
acquire the ability to act in it as a participant. Language is
not an “input” to a processor or device, but a structured niche
aﬀording complex and semiotically mediated communication,
cognition and participation. The capacity to learn language,
although it is almost certainly supported by genetic adaptations to
the biocultural niche of language, is not innate, but epigenetically
developed (Sinha, 1988, 2004, 2014).
EPIGENESIS, ENCHRONY, AND THE
EXTENDED HUMAN LIFE COURSE
Epigenesis and epigenetics are terms referring to inheritance
processes and mechanisms, at diﬀerent levels ranging from the
molecular to the organismic, that are controlled or modulated by
factors other than those inscribed in the genome (Jablonka and
Lamb, 2005). Epigenetic developmental processes in ontogenetic
behavioral development are those in which the developmental
trajectory and ﬁnal form of the developing behavior are a
consequence as much of the environmental information as of
the genetically encoded information. A genetically speciﬁed initial
behavioral repertoire is subsequently elaborated through experience
of a relevant environment, yielding an envelope of potential
trajectories and outcomes
(Sinha, 2013, pp. 264–265).
The process of elaboration is directional, and once it has taken
place the initial plasticity of the embryonic, or unelaborated,
repertoire is largely (though not necessarily wholly) lost. In
other words, epigenesis involves a developmental transition from
relative organismic plasticity and informational openness, to
relative rigidity and informational closure. Augmented epigenesis
can be hypothesized to be advantageous for organisms in
which phenogenotypic organism-niche couplings are both frequent
and variable, which is an appropriate general description of
the human biocultural organism. Regulatory genes augmenting
epigenetic openness can therefore be expected to have been
selected for in the human genome, permitting further adaptive
selection for domain-speciﬁc learning in the biocultural complex,
in particular for language. Although I do not reject the
possibility that the epigenetic processes selected in the evolution
of the human biocultural complex include a predisposition
for learning syntax, this does not necessarily imply that any
such predisposition is or was “dedicated” from the start
exclusively to language, and it certainly does not imply anything
resembling an innate Universal Grammar. In an epigenetic
perspective, any adaptive developmental predisposition for
learning language is unlikely either to involve direct coding of,
or to be dedicated exclusively to, linguistic structure (Mueller,
1996). Rather, we may hypothesize that epigenetically governed
adaptations initially evolved in response to prelinguistic socio-
communicative processes.
Infancy, childhood, and adolescence are not merely biological
stages of organismic development. They are also developmental
stages of the human-speciﬁc biocultural niche supporting
mutual, intersubjective, emotional, communicative, and
cognitive engagement (Trevarthen, 1998). In the course of
human development, the proximal environment of the organism
develops along with the maturational processes underlying the
individual’s development. This developmental, and developing,
niche includes as its most important component other human
beings, including the caregiving adults and older children who
participate in the co-construction of its material, communicative
and symbolic properties. This co-construction process involves
(a) the spatio-temporal organization of settings involving joint
actions contributing to the reproduction of socio-cultural
habitus (Bourdieu, 1977); and (b) the scaﬀolding and shaping of
interactions in the niche on the part of the caregiver (Wood et al.,
1976; Ninio and Bruner, 1978), in response to both the actions
and the competences of the developing child. These fundamental
processes in niche construction and niche development can be
thought of as involving the cultural and situational structuring
of aﬀordances for learning, and are the socio-developmental
mechanisms supporting inter-generational cultural transmission
in all human cultures.
Social learning of complex skill repertoires, including
language, is optimized by the extended childhood of our species.
As Arbib (2012, p. 166) observes, “the prolonged period of
infant dependency . . . combines with the willingness of adults
to act as caregivers and the consequent development of social
structures to provide the conditions for complex social learning.”
The biology of ontogenetic life history is assessed in comparative
research by physiological and anatomical markers. There is a
general consensus that the human extended life history did not
appear until the emergence of later members of the genus Homo
(Dean, 2007; Robson and Wood, 2008; Lee, 2012; Schwartz,
2012). Recent research suggests, moreover, that the early stages
of modern human (sapiens) life are uniquely extended, even
in comparison with Neanderthals (Smith et al., 2007a,b). The
earliest evidence of an extended human childhood with a life
history proﬁle similar to that of contemporary children is
from modern human child remains from 160,000 years ago
(Smith et al., 2007a). Smith (2013, p. 203) concludes that “the
characteristically prolonged development of living humans fully
evolved after (modern humans and Neanderthals) diverged,”
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signaling the “advent of corresponding social, biological, and
cultural changes necessary to support highly dependent children
with prolonged opportunities for social learning in early
childhood” (Smith et al., 2007a, p. 6132).
Evolutionary and developmental processes take place on
diﬀerent time scales or durées, of phylogenesis, sociogenesis
(or sociocultural evolution), ontogenesis, and microgenesis
(Valsiner and van der Veer, 2000). Although, as I stressed above,
the niche develops along with the developing human being,
the time scale that principally characterizes niche construction
and niche development processes is not that of ontogenesis,
but that of microgenesis. Microgenesis is a term coined by
Werner (1957) to denote developmental advance through
re-organization, occurring in the time scale of actual engagement
with a problem to be solved. Microgenesis as individual
or collaborative situated learning and development also
implicates the time scale of actual communicative interaction,
labeled enchrony by Enﬁeld (2011, 2013), in distinction
to the traditional structural linguistic distinction between
diachrony and synchrony. “An enchronic perspective on
human communication focuses on sequences of interlocking
or interdependent communicative moves that are taken to be
co-relevant, and causally conditionally related. Enchrony is a
level of temporal-causal grain (typically, ‘conversational time’)
that an analyst of communication can adopt, as distinct from
other possible perspectives, ﬁtted to other purposes, that focus
on other temporal scales and other kinds of causal-conditional
process; these include phylogenetic, diachronic, ontogenetic,
epigenetic, and synchronic perspectives.” (Enﬁeld, 2011, p. 287;
see also Steﬀensen and Pedersen, 2013).
Enchrony, in Enﬁeld’s deﬁnition, is prototypically
conversational temporality. Enchronic interactional
coordination is manifested, however, long before the emergence
in development of language, and is a fundamental property
of infant as well as adult communicative meaning-making,
probably implicated in both musical and narrative production
(Trevarthen, 2008). It can also be argued, however, that the notion
of enchrony can equally be applied to the planning, sequencing,
and timing of component actions whose combination makes
up complex praxic actions (Arbib, 2012), including cooperative
praxis. If this is correct, enchrony is, in general, the durée
that most appropriately characterizes human skilled action
and interaction, and that is in at least some circumstances
co-temporaneous with microgenesis, the appropriation and
mastery of new actions and new communicative resources.
We can visualize the diﬀerent, but inter-articulated time
scales (phylogenesis, sociogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis,
enchrony) as being embedded one within another (Figure 2).
Each level provides a context and platform for the levels that
are subsequently embedded, but this dependency is not one of
unidirectional determination. The processes that dynamically
unfold in the diﬀerent time scales are not independent of
each other. Ontogenesis, for example, evolves phylogenetically
and, through epigenesis and Baldwin eﬀects (Sinha, 1988, Ch.
4), phylogenetic evolution itself is mediated by ontogenetic
development. Microgenesis implicates and is supported by
enchrony. My argument, then, is that human infancy and
childhood is a developmental (and developing) niche that evolved
in our species, through a mechanism of augmented epigenesis
throughout an extended human life course, as an adaptation to
the enchronic properties of human action and interaction. This
adaptation in turn maximized the human microgenetic learning
potential underlying the cultural transmission of both language
and skilled praxic action.
Augmented epigenesis in the time-extended human
ontogenetic niche furnished, I suggest, a phenogenotypic
mechanism suitable for stabilizing and expanding the
diversiﬁcation and innovation in material and symbolic
cultures that ﬁrst appears in the archeological record in Southern
Africa in the Middle Stone Age, developing between 100,000
and 75,000 years ago (Henshilwood and Dubreuil, 2011;
Henshilwood et al., 2011). This diversiﬁcation and innovation is
taken by many archeologists to be the hallmark of “behavioral
modernity.” Criterial for behavioral modernity is the existence
of a symbolically mediated culture, in which “individuals
understand that artifacts are imbued with meaning and that
these meanings are construed and depend on collectively
shared beliefs,” which in turn “explains how human norms
and conventions diﬀer from the ritualized behaviors found
in non-human primates” (Henshilwood and Dubreuil, 2011,
pp. 368–369).
When did such normative meaning construal emerge in the
evolutionary history of the species? There is evidence of the
engraving by late Homo erectus of quasi-geometric designs on
shells, around half a million years ago (Joordens et al., 2014).
These ﬁndings compel the conclusion that the time depth of
the co-evolution of semiosphere and technosphere is far greater
than that of our species. Do they also compel the conclusion that
evolutionarily modern, complex language might be equally old?
Just such a hypothesis has been advanced by Dediu and Levinson
FIGURE 2 | Time scales of human evolution and development. Figure ©
Chris Sinha.
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(2013), who place the dawn of evolutionarily modern language
at around half a million years ago, with the common ancestor of
modern humans and Neanderthals. They suggest, furthermore,
that present-day languages have traces of the admixture of
Neanderthal languages, just as the genomes of some present-
day human populations exhibit traces of interbreeding with
Neanderthals.
There is indeed evidence that Neanderthals manifested some
of the practices clustered together as behavioral modernity,
including personal ornamentation and funerary practices
(d’Errico et al., 2012). It is highly likely that their communicative
capacities included multimodal proto-language. However, there
is at present no evidence that Neanderthals (or any common
ancestor of Neanderthals and modern humans) maintained
material-symbolic “techno-complexes,” of the kind inferable
from archeological remains of modern human populations in
Southern Africa, over extended periods. It is also noteworthy that
innovations introduced by Southern African modern humans in
the Middle Stone Age, some 80,000 years ago, disappear from
the archeological record at about 60,000 years ago, only to be
superseded by new innovations appearing some 15–20,000 years
later. Some of these later innovations (from about 44,000 years
ago) manifest apparent continuity with historic hunter-gatherer
societies (d’Errico et al., 2012). It seems, then, that the human
cultural “ratchet eﬀect” (Tomasello, 1999), by means of which
cultural innovations are preserved, transmitted and serve as the
foundation for subsequent innovation, may not have been fully
in place until quite late in the evolution of our species.
If we accept with (Smith et al., 2007a,b) that the modern
human life course was not shared by Neanderthals, it is a
plausible inference that the augmented epigenetic developmental
plasticity of our species was also not shared in the same degree by
any other (extinct) hominin species, but evolved either as part
of, or subsequent to, modern human speciation. What speciﬁc
advantage, then, might species-speciﬁc augmented epigenesis
have conferred, and with what consequences? Perhaps the
decisive selective advantage conferred by augmented epigenesis
had not only to do with the faithful copying and transmission
of speciﬁc material and symbolic practices, important as this
may be; but also with the role of learning and teaching in
generating and tracking cycles of expansion and stabilization
of the symbolic space of social and cultural structure, brought
into being by the evolution of the all-pervasive, linguistically
grounded semiosphere. We can think here, perhaps, of the
development of socio-cognitive logics such as kinship systems
and elaborate cosmologies. All of these involve a level of linguistic
complexity, involving ﬂexible cognitive construal (Langacker,
1987) and narrative (Bruner, 1990; Talmy, 2000), only to be
found in fully evolutionarily modern, speech-based and highly
grammaticalized languages.
My proposal, in summary, is that not only did the emergence
of the Homo sapiens species deliver a uniquely “language-ready
brain” (Arbib, 2012), but this brain was itself the product of a
“language-ready niche of development,” whose phenogenotypic
co-evolution with the human organism led to the marrying of
augmented epigenesis with the linguistically mediated teaching
and learning of social symbolic knowledge at some point in
the last 160,000–80,000 years. The evolutionary intertwining of
semiosphere and technosphere extends back in evolutionary time
at least half a million years, perhaps longer, and the modern
human mind is a product of niche-organism-niche interactions,
in which niche-niche synergies were mediated by the organism
and organismic behavior (Figure 3).
I have emphasized in this section the key role played by
the evolution of the capacity for enchronic communicative
coordination in the co-evolution of semiosphere and
technosphere, but this is not intended as a claim for its
exclusive importance in the evolving suite of human socio-
semiotic abilities. For example, internalized iconic narrative
representations of sequences of contiguous episodic memories
is likely to have been a key prerequisite both for the emergence
of language (Stutz, 2014), long predating complex and
perspectivized narratives; and for the learning of complex
sequences of constructive praxic action. The more general point
is that the co-evolutionary dynamic linking semiosphere and
technosphere was fundamentally transformed by the emergence
of evolutionarily modern languages as the fundamental ground
of symbolically mediated social institutions. Grammaticalization
based upon perspectivization, alternate construal, markers of
intersubjectivity/alterity (Danziger and Rumsey, 2013) and many
other socio-cognitive dimensions (Talmy, 2015) made possible
the elaboration of kinship relationships, mythic narratives,
cosmologies and the ritual enactment of socially diﬀerentiated
belief and knowledge systems. It is as a consequence of this
ﬁnal “leap to language” (which I hypothesize to have occurred
after modern human speciation) that the ground was laid for
the emergence of symbolic cognitive technologies that have
fundamentally re-shaped (and continue to re-shape) the human
biocultural complex.
BEYOND LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY: TIME
IN MIND, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY
A striking exemplar of a historically important symbolic cognitive
artifact type is the medieval clock shown in Figure 4. Such
FIGURE 3 | Niche-organism-niche co-evolution of the human
biocultural complex. Figure © Chris Sinha.
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FIGURE 4 | A restored medieval clock in Lund Cathedral, Sweden. Image © Chris Sinha.
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clocks are scattered throughout North-West and Central Europe.
Early church and cathedral clocks lacked faces, and sounded
the hours by the ringing of bells (Whitrow, 1988), but later
ones incorporated clock faces schematically representing cyclic
time intervals—in the case illustrated, not only the hours of
the day, but also months and years. The circular form of the
clock face iconically represents the cyclic schemawhich organizes
the numerically (ordinally) based time intervals. Although
clock hours and calendar intervals are a much older invention
than the mechanical clock itself, dating to the Babylonian
civilization, these time intervals were dependent upon number
notation, as well as upon the astronomical observations measured
and notated. Number notations themselves are derived from
linguistic number systems whose origins are to be found in
counting practices. So there is a fundamental ambiguity about
the notion of “clock time”: is it that which is measured by the
instrument, or is it the calibrations that are produced by the
mechanical or other operations of the measuring artifact? In fact,
these two aspects are, from a sociogenetic point of view, two sides
of the same coin: only by constructing symbolically based, time-
calibrating systems do societies arrive at a conceptualization of
time as a “dimension” (or “timeline”) that can be measured; and
this conceptualization is in turn embodied in material anchors
(Hutchins, 2005) that both represent the conceptualization, and
permit or improve the measuring practice.
The entrenching of “calendar time” (important for the
computation of saints’ days), and later “clock time,” had profound
consequences for medieval and early modern European societies.
It enabled the accurate determination and registration of both
religious festivals and secular time. The consequences of the
invention and cultural evolution of the calendar and the clock
have been no less transformative for the mind than for the
social world. Concomitantly with the historical invention of
more accurate ways of measuring metric time intervals, a new
concept of time of time evolved: abstract “Time as Such.” By
this, I mean that notion of time that metaphorically situates
or encompasses the events that occur “in time,” and their
time of occurrence, analogously to the way that space situates
or encompasses objects and their locations. “Time as Such”
is the pre-theoretical equivalent of what was referred to by
Newton (2009/1686) as “Absolute Time.” Newton’s (2009/1686)
postulation of the metaphysical reality of Absolute Time was
famously challenged by Einstein’s theory of relativity (Einstein,
1920), but “Time as Such” is deeply rooted in everyday language
practices. It can be thought of as reiﬁed time, conceptualized as an
abstract but quantiﬁable substance with a quasi-spatial extension.
This substance either metaphorically “ﬂows” (moving along a
timeline in relation to an observer), or is a medium, landscape
or timeline within or along which the observer moves. These
two metaphoric conceptualizations are generally referred to as
“Moving Time” and “Moving Ego” (Clark, 1973), and they are
commonly manifested in many languages in such constructions
as, respectively, “Graduation Day is approaching” and “she is
coming up to graduation.”
The supposed absence of the “Newtonian” notion of
“Time as Such” in some cultures was key to Whorf’s (1950)
celebrated “principle of linguistic relativity.” Speakers of the
Amerindian language Hopi, he maintained, have “no general
notion or intuition of time as a smooth ﬂowing continuum
in which everything in the universe proceeds at an equal
rate, out of a future, through a present, into a past; or, in
which, to reverse the picture, the observer is being carried
in the stream of duration continuously away from a past
and into a future” (Whorf, 1950, p. 27). Whorf (1950) did
not publish extensive linguistic data that could underpin this
claim; those which he did publish were open to the objection
of being idiosyncratically interpreted, and his analysis of
the Hopi language has been challenged in subsequent, more
rigorously documented scholarship (Malotki, 1983)5. However,
my colleagues and I conducted a study of an Amazonian language
and culture, Amondawa, in which [as Whorf (1950) maintained
was the case for Hopi] there is no translation equivalent for
the word “time,” no evidence of a cultural concept of “Time
as Such” and no use of metaphoric Moving Ego or Moving
Time constructions (although bilingual Amondawa speakers
understand such constructions in Portuguese; Sinha et al., 2011).
Crucially, the Amondawa language has only four numbers and
does not employ a calendric system. All Amondawa time interval
concepts are event-based (da Silva Sinha et al., 2012), that is they
are non-metric and are derived from the duration and succession
of natural events, and the conventional timing and duration of
habitual social activities6.
Our research on cultural and linguistic concepts of time in
Amondawa provides a partial vindication of Whorf’s (1950)
insistence that “Newtonian time” (or what I have termed “Time
as Such”) is not a transcultural universal. Our ﬁndings, however,
are not consistent with a construal of the “linguistic relativity” of
thought as involving a two-term relationship between linguistic
structure and individual cognitive process. Rather, and in line
with the arguments advanced by Palmer (1996), we would
view languages as reﬂecting and entrenching culturally speciﬁc
patterns of thought that also ﬁnd expression in other semiotic
vehicles. In particular, Sinha et al. (2011, p. 165) advance
the Mediated Mapping Hypothesis, according to which the
“elaboration of (space-time metaphoric) mapping is mediated by
number concepts and number notation systems, the deployment
of which in symbolic cognitive artifacts such as calendar systems
transforms the conceptual representation of time from event-
based to (metric) time interval systems; yielding the culturally
constructed concept of ‘Time as Such.’
This re-interpretation of the issues surrounding linguistic
relativity is, I suggest, in tune with the Zeitgeist. The “cognitive
turn” in language sciences of the past 25 years is now
being followed by a “cultural turn” (Everett, 2012; Bernárdez,
2013), highlighting the dynamic and mutual inter-relations
between language, cognition and culture, and their co-variation.
The sociocultural contextualization of language and cognitive
5Malotki’s analysis has also been challenged on the grounds that it does not
adequately address the (admittedly idiosyncratically and at times opaquely
expressed) theoretical propositions advanced byWhorf (Hinton, 1988).
6Amondawa is not the only language in which the absence of a cultural concept of
“Time as Such,” and of its anchoring in a calendar or timeline, is correlated with the
absence or lack of productivity of space-time metaphoric mapping (Le Guen and
Pool Balam, 2012; Levinson and Majid, 2013).
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diversity in our and others’ recent work, together with a general
theoretical perspective of extended material-symbolic cultural
embodiment, points the way to a new, post-Whorﬁan perspective
on the inter-relations between language, cognition and culture,
and their co-variation (Sinha and Bernárdez, 2015). A core
theoretical construct of this post-Whorﬁan perspective is what
Birth (2012, p. 19) dubs ‘artifactual relativity’: “cognitive artifacts
have far greater potential for channeling thought than language
. . . clocks and calendars being two important examples. In eﬀect,
whereas the strength of the linguistic relativity hypothesis is hotly
contested, a parallel hypothesis about artifactual relativity has
received little attention” 7.
The phenomena studied through the lens of artifactually
mediated relativity, or variation, may be prototypically
instantiated by symbolic cognitive artifacts, but they do not
stop there, and may also proﬁtably be the subject of future
investigation at a more macro-social scale. Methodologically,
this means that we need to step back from our preoccupation
with the “local,” the here-and-now of experimental situations, in
our explorations of the language of space and time. Theories of
language variation now recognize the prevalence of persistent,
lexically widely distributed language-speciﬁc patterns of semantic
motivation, or “semplates” (Levinson and Burenhult, 2009). This
approach can be taken a further step forward, by extending
the linguistic analysis of recurrent, culturally motivated pattern
to the constructional and metaphoric levels, and seeking
motivations that unify diﬀerent levels of meaning within diverse
multi-level, material-symbolic socio-cognitive niches.
The sociocultural structuring of space and time is achieved
by practices involving the construction and use of artifacts and
artifact systems that blend the material and the symbolic at
diﬀerent scales. These include the kind of symbolic cognitive
artifacts that have been in focus in this article, such as compasses,
clocks, calendars, and other time interval systems based on
language. Material symbolic mediators also include, however,
the built environment (such as architecture and village and city
layout); and the humanly shaped landscape (such as geomorphic
earthworks). The meanings of these material-symbolic systems
range from the expression of social diﬀerentiation (gender, rank,
clan, moiety etc.) in spatial and temporal dimensions; through
architectural renderings of cosmological and religious beliefs; to
the spatio-temporal ordering of normatively organized activities
by means of time-reckoning artifacts.
These considerations challenge the assumptions that have
guided many investigations of linguistic space-time mapping,
which have been overly (if unconsciously) constricted by
investigators’ own cultural experience and cultural concepts of
time. We need to recognize that the time that we inhabit is
an artifact, a ﬁction in a way, which is itself the product of
the artifacts that our ancestors have invented. Time, we might
say, is a cognitive meta-niche, a necessary regulative order
for the reproduction of the multiplicity of other cognitive-
cultural-material niches that support our activities, practices,
7Birth arrived at this formulation, on the basis of his research in the anthropology
of time, entirely independently of the similar arguments about artefactual
mediation proposed by Sinha et al. (2011).
communications and reﬂections. But it is simultaneously a
cognitive construct, assembled through the spatialization and
reiﬁcation of temporal experience. When employed to regulate
social and economic life, clock and calendar impose a ﬁctive
and conventional structure on mundane, terrestrial event time,
“freezing” temporal passage into regimes of activity-mapping and
time-planning.
The reifying ﬁction of “Time as Such” is entrenched in
conventional metaphors and idiomatic usage, in which “time is
money,” “time is scarce,” people are time-poor, and time endlessly
presses up against us. The symbolic cognitive artifacts of clock
and calendar have changed our minds along with the niches our
minds inhabit, and there is no going back in time. These artifacts,
and the language practices that they support and constrain, are
fundamental to the regulation and reproduction of every social
institution in which we participate. The ﬁrst, naïve response of
many people to hearing there still exist societies in which these
artifacts are non-existent, and in which all time intervals and
temporal landmarks are event-based, is to ask: does that mean
they have no idea of time? How can they organize their lives?
And yet, a moment’s reﬂection will tell us that the event-based
habitus of the Amondawa is representative of the conceptual
matrix framing temporal experience that has been characteristic
of the majority of human societies. Human beings have lived in
small-scale, face-to-face, technologically simple societies for most
of the history and prehistory of our species. It is our fast-tracked,
globalized, 24/7 turbo-capitalist society that is the exception.
Artifactual “Time as Such” has colonized the niche, and the niche
in turn has colonized our minds.
CONCLUDING REFLECTION: AGENCY
VS. ARTIFICIALITY—A FALSE
DICHOTOMY?
The linguistically constituted human semiosphere is a species-
speciﬁc biocultural complex, grounded in the elaboration of
the semiotic function (Piaget, 1945). This function, in turn,
is constituted by the interplay and evolutionary-developmental
interlacing of its two constituent semiotic relations, “counting
as” and “standing for.” These two semiotic relations are,
I suggest, evolutionary derivatives of ritualization and the
evolution of symbols from signals (Sinha, 2004); in which
the conventionalization of intersubjective participation in
niche-regulated activities played a central role (Sinha and
Rodríguez, 2008). The evolution of the human semiosphere, in
which language as a biocultural niche is developmentally and
processually interdependent with the technosphere of material
artifactual supports for human social interaction and social
practice (Sinha, 2005), is what accounts for the discontinuity
dividing human from non-human cognition and culture, and
the evolutionary emergence of human social institutions. This
discontinuity has been ampliﬁed by the consolidation, through
language, of human culture as a fundamentally symbolic
biocultural complex. A critical role in this consolidation was
played by the co-evolution of the biocultural niche of infancy and
childhood with the biocultural niche of language.
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If (as I have argued) symbolic cognitive artifacts have the eﬀect
of changing both world andmind, is it enough to think of them as
mere “tools” for the realization of human deliberative intention,
or are they themselves agents? This question would be eﬀectively
precluded by some deﬁnitions of agency, such as that to be found
in Barandiaran et al. (2009, p. 3), who state that “as opposed to
other systems, agents appear as uniﬁed in themselves and do not
depend on their being useful for an external entity or accorded on
(sic) their identity by a community of other agents.” A problem
with this generalized approach, that seeks to deﬁne agency in
terms that span biology and Artiﬁcial Intelligence, is that, in
emphasizing the distinction between agent and environment,
and contrasting agents with artifacts, it fails to engage with the
complex network of mediation of distinctively human, social
agency by artifactual means. It is precisely the importance of this
network for both cognitive and social theory that Latour (1996)
highlights by introducing the concept of “interobjectivity.” In a
complementary fashion to the way that the term intersubjectivity
denotes the sharing of the subjective aspect of agency with other
subjects (Zlatev et al., 2008), interobjectivity denotes the way in
which agents “share the social with things . . . Objects do do
things . . . one can never reduce or dissolve an actor into a ﬁeld
of forces or into a structure. One can only share in the action,
distribute it with other actants.” (Latour, 1996, pp. 235–237). In
other words, the speciﬁcally social form that human agency takes
is based not only upon social interactivity with other agents (De
Jaegher and Froese, 2009)—which Latour (1996) argues cannot
alone provide a solution to the “structure vs. agency” problem
in social theory—but also upon its distribution amongst human
and artifactual actors: “(for) humans it is almost impossible to
ﬁnd an interaction that does not make some appeal to technics”
(Latour, 1996, p. 238). It is precisely this notion of “sharing
sociality with things” (ibid: 237) that I stress by introducing the
term “technosphere”
Many discussions of distributed and extended cognition focus
on the eﬀects of artifacts on cultural evolution in terms of
the externalization of information storage, and the enhanced
accuracy of transmission of knowledge and social memory
(Donald, 1991). I have argued that this, while important, is not the
whole story. Symbolic cognitive artifacts are not just repositories,
they are also agents of change, constituting new domains (such
as “Time as Such”), and potentiating new practices. We can
acknowledge that the agency of artifacts is (at least until
now) ultimately dependent on human agency, without which
artifactual agency would neither exist nor have eﬀect; but it would
be wrong to think of artifactual agency as merely derivative,
as being like a kind of gloriﬁed transmission-belt for human
agentive intention. Human agency, in many cases, is co-agency,
not only with other human beings but with at least some kinds
of artifacts. Co-agentive artifacts play an ever-expanding role
in the human biocultural complex, and assume increasingly
autonomous modes of agency. This poses a real challenge both
to our understanding of the nature of knowledge and to our
understanding of the nature of ethical and social responsibility in
science. More than that, the challenge is potentially an existential
one to the future of our species in its self-made ecology.
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